# Smartphones 1AC

## 1AC – Generic

### Framework

#### The standard is mitigating structural violence.

#### 1] Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is fundamentally flawed because exclusion is not based on dessert but rather on arbitrarily perceived differences.

Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|[Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice] “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5 ghs//VA

Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

#### 2] Debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences—ideal theories ignore the concrete nature of the world and legitimize oppression.

Dr. Tommy J. Curry 14, “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century”, Victory Briefs, 2014, BE

**Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue**, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### 3] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.

Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

### Advantage

#### Smartphone handguns create a new generation of weaponry – current law enforcement isn’t ready

RT 4/5 (RT News, first Russian 24/7 English-language news channel, “’Disaster waiting to happen’: US senator calls to ban smartphone-shaped gun,” April 5th, 2016, https://www.rt.com/usa/338530-senator-ban-smartphone-gun/)//ghs-VA

A new foldable gun that looks remarkably like a smartphone is set to hit the market later this year, but at least one US senator is calling for the government to investigate – and keep it away from American stores. Senator Charles Schumer (D-New York) said the firearm – a .380 caliber, double-barrel pistol that can be folded up into a design resembling a smartphone and carried in a back pocket – may be illegal and pose a threat to law enforcement. He called on the Justice Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to investigate before it’s released, AP reported. “At first glance or even second glance it looks like an iPhone,” said Schumer, who supports gun control policies. “Take a closer look and you will see that it’s a real, deadly handgun.” He added that firearms resembling everyday items might be illegal and called the product “a disaster waiting to happen.” "Just like toys that too much look like handguns should not be sold, handguns that look too much like toys should not be sold," said Schumer, according to Fox News. Revealed in March, the gun was designed by Minnesota-based company Ideal Conceal, and is described as having “high velocity, increased accuracy.” The $400 firearm features a grip that can be folded up into the gun to conceal the trigger and trigger guard, and it even has a phone clip to allow for people to attach it to their pants or belt. “Smartphones are EVERYWHERE, so your new pistol will easily blend in with today’s environment,” the company website reads. “In its locked position it will be virtually undetectable because it hides in plain sight.” The weapon is scheduled for a mid-2016 release, but Ideal Conceal CEO Kirk Kjellberg told AP that the outrage was overblown. He said the weapon is defensive in nature and argued other guns are also easily concealed and more powerful than his. "The idea that this is going to cause some new big threat is just not true," he said. While other folding guns do exist, National Rifle Association Museums director Jim Supica told CNN that existing weapons “still look like guns.” This new gun does not. Either way, Schumer isn’t convinced. He said the weapon had thousands of pre-orders and was “clearly being marketed for nefarious purposes,” the New York Daily News reported. Among his concerns are that police won’t be able to tell if a suspect is reaching for a phone or a gun. He also linked the issue to terrorism. “Why would we want to make it easier for criminals or terrorists like those who attacked Paris and Brussels to wreak havoc?” he said. "What’s next, a gun made to look like a chocolate bar?”

#### Unique characteristics make this weapon uniquely threatening

Samuels 3/30 (John, reporter @ cda news, “Police Voice Concerns About Folding Handgun That Looks Like Smartphone,” March 30th, 2016, https://cdanews.com/2016/03/police-voice-concerns-about-folding-handgun-that-looks-like-smartphone/)//ghs-VA

However, the innocuous appearance of the .380-caliber double-barreled derringer pistol when it is folded up and resembles a smartphone is one of the characteristics about the firearm that police are voicing concerns about. While the Ideal Conceal handgun, which will have a list price of S395 when it becomes available in mid-2016, might turn out to be the ideal concealed sidearm of their dreams for the customers who buy it, police are concerned that it might turn out to be a nightmare for them. In the words of Bill Johnson, executive director and general counsel for the National Association of Police Organizations, according to Fox News, "In general, the concept of any kind of weapon that's disguised, so that it's not apparent that it's a weapon, would be cause for concern." The Ideal Conceal handgun's website proudly proclaims, "Smartphones are EVERYWHERE, so your new pistol will easily blend in with today's environment. In its locked position it will be virtually undetectable because it hides in plain sight" The website also adds that the Ideal Conceal handguns will be "100% American Made. 100% American Parts. 100% American Owned." Also, the folding gun, which incorporates a hammerless firing system, can be clipped to a person's side until it is needed or safely carried in a purse. Developer Kirk Kjellberg stated that he has already had a lot of people express an interest in wanting to purchase one of the folding handguns he has engineered to look like a smartphone. He said that potential customers have already deluged him with 2,500 emails and he said the company has received over 4,000 pre-orders. Despite the worries that some police officers have voiced about how difficult it will be to distinguish the Ideal Conceal handgun from a smartphone, Kjellberg stated, according to the New York Daily News, "I had a police chief write to me and say he wants them for their officers when they're off-duty." With a gun being so easily transformed into what looks like an everyday object, a smartphone, simply by folding it, there are some police officers who believe that the handgun might become very popular with criminals. Kjelberg said, that the pistol is "just made for mainstream America, not criminal enterprise." While the folding guns definitely have a "cool factor" attached to them, and some police officers are wanting to purchase them, other members of the police force have worries that they will find a wide appeal among criminals. Also, because of the folding handguns resembling smartphones when they are closed, the gun might be considered to be a "conceal carry," even when it is in plain sight, but in its folded position. Depending on state and local laws, the double barrel two-shot handgun might require owners to possess a concealed carry permit. The Ideal Conceal website suggests that people consult their state and local concealment laws.

#### Crime destroys value to life and social fabric

NCPA 4 (National Center for Policy Analysis, “Economic and Social Effects of Crime - Growing Interest In The Costs Of Crime, Determining Costs, The High Cost Of Crime, Community Efforts To Avoid Crime Costs,” 2004, http://law.jrank.org/pages/12125/Economic-Social-Effects-Crime.html)//ghs-VA

Crime is a major part of every society. Its costs and effects touch just about everyone to some degree. The types of costs and effects are widely varied. In addition, some costs are short-term while others last a lifetime. Of course the ultimate cost is loss of life. Other costs to victims can include medical costs, property losses, and loss of income. Losses to both victims and nonvictims can also come in the form of increased security expenses including stronger locks, extra lighting, parking in more expensive secure lots, security alarms for homes and cars, and maintaining guard dogs. Considerable money is spent to avoid being victimized. Other types of expenses can include a victim or person fearful of crime moving to a new neighborhood, funeral expenses, legal fees, and loss of school days. Some costs of crime are less tangible (not easily or precisely identified). These kinds of costs can include pain and suffering, and a lower quality of life. There are also the traumatic impacts on friends and the disruption of family. Behavior can be forever changed and shaped by crime, whether it be weighing the risks of going to certain places or even the fear of making new friends.

#### These phones would escalate tensions between citizens due to their innocuous nature

Lartey 4/5 (Jamiles, reporter @ the guardian, “Senator demands investigation of gun that looks like a smartphone,” April 5th, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/05/smartphone-gun-investigation-schumer-ideal-conceal-pocket-pistol)//ghs-VA

Senator Chuck Schumer has called on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Justice Department to investigate a new firearm designed to look exactly like a smartphone. “What’s next, a gun made to look like a chocolate bar?” Schumer said at a press conference on Monday. “Enough is enough.” The weapon, marketed by the company Ideal Conceal is a two-shot .38 caliber derringer – or small pocket pistol – with a foldout handle. When the handle is collapsed in, the weapon looks nearly indistinguishable from a smartphone device. “Smartphones are EVERYWHERE, so your new pistol will easily blend in with today’s environment,” the manufacturer’s site reads. “In its locked position it will be virtually undetectable because it hides in plain sight.” The weapon is selling for $395, substantially less than the current generation of flagship mobile devices, and is expected to be available in mid-2016. A spokesperson for the ATF said the agency had no comment. Schumer worried that such a concealable weapon would make it easier for people intending to commit violence to evade law enforcement. “Why would we want to make it easier for criminals or terrorists like those who attacked Paris and Brussels to wreak havoc?” he said. Widespread availability of the device could also lead police officers to uncertainty in tense interactions with citizens. “Imagine a scenario in which a police officer is not able to tell whether a violent criminal is pulling out a gun or an iPhone,” Schumer said. Even without the Ideal Conceal weapons available, officers sometimes claim they mistook a mobile device for a weapon after a shooting incident. Federal law mandates that toy guns be marked with a “blaze orange” tip to differentiate them from real ones, but those laws do not work the other way. Some jurisdictions ban the disguise of real guns as fake, but laws intended to prohibit the disguise of guns as other objects are less clear. “Typically guns that can be concealed, guns that look like wallets, pens and knives, are illegal under the law,” Schumer later said in a statement. A provision of the National Firearms Act does address what it calls “Any Other Weapons” including concealable firearms. At the time of the act’s passage in 1934 this meant devices such as pen guns, wallet guns and umbrella guns. The devices were not banned outright by the act, but rather required to be registered, taxed more heavily than a traditional firearm, and their manufacturing subject to approval by the ATF. Failure to obtain this clearance for a disguised explosive weapon like the smartphone gun constitutes a felony under the act. Neither the ATF nor the manufacturer immediately responded to an inquiry on whether this approval had been granted. Adam Winkler, a professor of constitutional law at UCLA, said the NFA was intended to restrict the type of firearms criminals use and said the smartphone gun fits that description. “This kind of gun is not preferred by law-abiding people generally,” he said, noting that they are often less reliable. “If you’re a criminal, though, having a gun that’s less effective but more disguised becomes a priority.”

#### This justifies an open season on black people by the police – the commonness of smartphones makes the threat extremely high

Busch 4/4 (Emily, reporter @ the Odyssey, “The Problem With The Smartphone Gun,” April 4, 2016, http://theodysseyonline.com/minnesota/problem-smartphone-gun/386330)//ghs-VA

The problem with the gun is one of identification. Not being able to distinguish a smartphone from a handgun has raised concerns for many people, especially police. Police already have enough on their hands with cases of mistaken guns. Take, for example, Tamir Rice -- the 12-year-old boy who was tragically shot for playing with a toy gun in a park. Andy Lopez, a 13-year-old boy, was also shot by police for carrying an airsoft gun without the orange markings to a friend's house, appearing to be an AK-47 assault rifle. The list goes on and on of incidents such as these. Imagine an officer going to a car for a traffic stop and seeing a smartphone in the hand or lap of the driver. Today, this wouldn't raise too many concerns, except for perhaps that the driver had been distracted texting. However, with the invention of the new smartphone gun, the officer must make a judgement call on whether the object is, in fact, a phone or a lethal handgun. Make the wrong decision and conflicts could arise quickly. Out of fear the driver has a handgun, the officer could shoot based on the threat for his life. Even if the smartphone really happened to be a smartphone, the actions of the officer would likely hold up in court. On the flip side, if the officer assumed the gun was just a smartphone, he could put his own life or the life of others in danger.

#### Plan: The states of the United States ought to ban the private ownership of the smartphone handgun.

**Wyatt 4/7** (Dennis, opinion writer and columnist, “BAN THIS GUN,” April 7, 2016, http://www.mantecabulletin.com/m/section/38/article/133785/)//ghs-VA

I wanted to call Kirk **Kjellberg** an idiot. That, however, would be highly unfair and uncivil given I’ve never met the guy. So I’ll just say he apparently **lacks a conscience or isn’t tempered by common sense**. Kjellberg is the CEO of Ideal Conceal that plans to roll out a concealed weapon that looks like a replica of a smartphone in a case. That’s right. A smartphone. They’re the same device a growing number of young men reach for when ordered by police to put up their hands. Who knows what possesses them to do so? Perhaps they want to record the encounter to post on You Tube. Maybe it’s a reflex since I’m willing to bet **the typical under 25 male goes for his cell phone at least two dozen times an hour**. **More than a few young men managed to get themselves shot** — and sometimes killed — **by law enforcement officers that have a** split second to assess a situation. And for those of you that may think every police officer is trigger happy, I refer you to a classic Bluebloods TV episode where the New York Police Commissioner played by Tom Selleck was queried by a reporter at a press conference whether he thought an officer’s fatal shooting of a man who reached into his pocket and pulled out what ended up being an unloaded weapon was justified. The commissioner asks the reporter what he would have done. The reporter launches into a verbal description of what he might do but the commissioner cuts him off after four seconds. “Too late,” the commissioner says, “you’re dead.” Now along comes Kjellberg eager to sell a gun that even up-close based on website and Facebook images his firm has posted looks exactly like an iPhone in its case. We’re not talking 50 yards away. Sitting at your computer less than a foot away it looks like what Tim Cook of Apple is hawking these days. The two-shot wonder that Ideal Conceal describes as having “high velocity, increased accuracy” can be yours for $395. **The pending launch of a device that can end up making encounters between police and those they are ordering not to reach into their pockets** even more deadly has drawn the ire of New York Senator Chuck Schumer. The senator astutely notes **the iPhone gun would pose a threat to law enforcement officers as they would be in situations where they couldn’t tell whether a suspect was pulling out a smartphone or a gun**. Kjellberg pooh-poohs such concerns noting it is only a defensive weapon and that there are plenty of such devices capable of firing more than two bullets. Kjellberg in pursuit of the almighty dollar wants to take a device that isn’t a gun that already gets suspects shot when they reach into their pockets for it when told not to do so by officers and make it into a gun. The odds are there are a number of incidents every day where an officer is able to ascertain the time a suspect is reaching for is a smartphone stopping them in the nick of time from discharging their weapons. Now in the name of profit Kjellberg wants to set the stage for more officers to not hesitate and spend perhaps another second sizing up a situation. That extra second not only could make the difference in a suspect being shot but it could also result in an officer being killed if the smartphone ends up being a product of Idea Conceal. Kjellberg says he came up with the idea for the lethal smartphone when a youngster was able to catch a glimpse of his concealed weapon he has a permit to carry while he was in a restaurant. So instead of being more responsible and truly concealing his weapon, Kjellberg thinks people like him are better off concealing their weapons as common devices such as smartphones that wouldn’t even warrant a second glance from the public. Of course there’s the technical legal issue that you can’t openly carry a concealed weapon which means an Ideal Conceal customer not keeping his loaded — or unloaded — pseudo iPhone concealed at all times is breaking the law. Kjellberg further defends his new weapon as saying not only is it a defensive weapon as if defensive weapons are never used as offensive weapons, but that there are plenty of small versions of concealed guns being sold that fire more than two bullets. True but they also don’t look like iPhones. They look like guns. And let’s not forget the fact **someone who would carry an Ideal Conceal iPhone is highly likely to also carry a real iPhone**. **What if they go for the wrong smartphone when they are confronted by a criminal threatening them**? **Officers with training have been known to pull guns instead of stun guns despite differences in design and weight**. **Selling a pseudo iPhone** as a defensive weapon for someone who may have to use it **doesn’t seem that wise given they could grab for the wrong phone and end up being killed**. Any adult with common sense would see the folly of carrying a concealed weapon that looks like an iPhone and only fires two bullets. Even if they pull out the right iPhone, it’s pretty risky given few people can shoot as well as the fictional James Bond let alone doing so with a converted Paper Mate pen or a make believe iPhone6. The Walter Mittys out there may buy them but is it safe to sell such a weapon to someone living in his own fantasy world? The “I Spy” mentality portrayed by Bill Cosby and Robert Culp — or should that be “iSpy” — of the 1960s TV show fame is marketed at those who are infatuated with video games such as “Grand Theft Auto” and “Call of Duty.” It’s asking to turn horseplay deadly. And forget the fact that teaching kids what a gun is gets thrown out the window if someone with an Ideal Conceal smartphone carelessly leaves it where a 6-year-old — most of whom eagerly play with smartphones — can access it. The Ideal Conceal smartphone gun is anything but smart. It should be banned.

### Underview – Subsets

#### Subsets are good—ban just means prohibit

OED, “ban”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/ban

Officially or legally prohibit:¶ he was banned from driving for a year

#### Whole res is terrible—one aff for 4 months *guarantees* redundant debates especially since the only person who advocates a total ban explicitly is Dixon—that outweighs

A] there’s plenty of time to write negs to lots of affs and generics are still a thing.

B] there’s 0 education with their interp since we’ve learned everything about the topic long before it’s over—it would literally be the same 1AC and 1NC every round.

C] breadth is good—most of the learning in debate occurs in research outside of rounds so forcing them to research multiple affs magnifies the amount we learn and coopts all depth arguments—topic education is important—it helps us become more informed citizens who can enact change *and* research skills are valuable—they give us skills to learn about stuff in the future which is a prerequisite to successfully advocating change *and* key to information processing—we need skills to sift through massive amounts of data in a digital age.

David McCandless 10, award-winning writer, designer and author August 2010, David McCandless: The beauty of data visualization, http://www.ted.com/talks/david\_mccandless\_the\_beauty\_of\_data\_visualization.html#

**It feels like we're all suffering from information overload or data glut**. And the good news is **there might be an easy solution to that**, and that's using our eyes more. So, **visualizing information**, **so that we can see the patterns and connections that matter** and then designing that information so it makes more sense, **or it tells a story**, **or allows us to focus only on the information that's important**. Failing that, visualized information can just look really cool.

There aren’t infinite affs—this claim is just false—functional limits check because people don’t advocate banning each type of gun individually AND there’s not distinct advantages for each so generics apply to most of them—they pretty much only specify high mag guns, semi-automatic ones, and smartphones, which means there are generously 5 affs on the TOC topic—this shouldn’t be hard to prep for.

### Underview – K

#### Gun control should be a debate that citizens engage in about crafting good policies

Andrew Jay McClurg 92, [Professor of Law, University of Arkansas], "The Rhetoric of Gun Control," The American University Law Review, Vol. 42, 1992.

Fallacies are bad rhetoric because they lead to bad decisionmaking.¶ The essential premise of this Article is that it is better to make¶ decisions based on straight thinking than on crooked thinking. 9¶ While this may seem to state the obvious, an examination of the¶ rhetoric used in virtually any political debate shows that we usually¶ do not abide by this principle in the arena of public decisionmaking.¶ As Jeremy Bentham documented more than one hundred and fifty¶ years ago, fallacies are common in the discussions of important social¶ issues in democratic systems.10 Indeed, there seems to be a positive¶ correlation between the importance of an issue, at least as¶ perceived by the populace, and our readiness to resort to bad rhetoric¶ in debating it.¶ Gun control is a premiere example of such an issue. As demonstrated¶ by the debate over the Brady bill, few issues are capable of¶ generating such intense rhetorical conflict among the American¶ people. As with other controversial issues such as abortion and affirmative¶ action, opinions about gun control are almost always passionately¶ held and in diametric opposition.¶ Regrettably, while there is room for reasonable persons to disagree¶ about gun control,I' we have as a nation chosen to disagree in a most disagreeable manner. Excepting a limited number of scholarly¶ commentaries, 12 discourse on gun control has been plagued by¶ bad rhetoric. The Brady bill debate exemplifies the prevalence of¶ poor rhetoric and defective reasoning in gun control argumentation.¶ At its best, the debate over the Brady bill seldom rose above¶ the level of shrill hyperbole.' 3 At its worst, the discussion sank into¶ the muck of name-calling and non sequitur.14 This Article exposes the fallacies in the rhetoric of gun control.¶ Concentrating on the debate over the Brady bill, the Article guides¶ the reader through the treacherous terrain of gun control argumentation¶ by identifying and analyzing the wide variety of reasoning defects¶ employed by participants in the debate. The Article is process¶ oriented. No attempt is made to address the ultimate question of¶ whether the nation's gun policies should be reformed. Until we first¶ reform the debate, we cannot hope to approach law reform in a rational¶ way.¶ In analyzing the rhetoric of gun control, I have attempted to be¶ fair and balanced, attacking the flaws in reasoning on both sides of¶ the debate. As a proponent of gun control, I initially thought this¶ approach would prove difficult. Gun control advocates like to believe¶ that only those who oppose gun control are guilty of deceptive¶ and fallacious rhetoric, but scrutiny of the Brady bill debate reveals¶ that this assumption is false.' 5 The pro-Brady bill forces contrib- uted more than enough bad rhetoric to the gun control debate to¶ allow for relatively evenhanded treatment of the two sides of the¶ issue.1 6¶ The importance of dissecting gun control rhetoric extends beyond¶ the issue of gun control, or even law reform in general. Understanding¶ rhetoric is a process every student of the law should¶ care about. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion and persuasion is the¶ lawyer's stock in trade. Advocates cannot be completely effective¶ unless they first master the tools of advocacy. Learning to distinguish¶ between good rhetoric and bad rhetoric, that is, learning to¶ recognize and identify flaws in reasoning, is an essential part of¶ every lawyer's education.

#### Government-as-heuristic is not an abstraction, but rather provides a means of understanding the state and breaking it down.

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By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84

#### Critique is useless without the 1AC’s concrete nature

Henry A. Giroux 15 [American scholar and cultural critic. One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy], “Beyond Dystopian Visions in the Age of Neoliberal Authoritarianism”, Truthout, 4 Nov 2015, BE

Fifth, another serious challenge facing advocates of a new truly democratic social order is the task of developing a discourse of both critique and possibility or what I have called a discourse of educated hope. Critique is important and is crucial to break the hold of common-sense assumptions that legitimate a wide range of injustices. The language of critique is also crucial for making visible the workings of unequal power and the necessity of holding authority accountable. But critique is not enough and without a discourse of hope, it can lead to a ~~paralyzing~~ despair or, even worse, a ~~crippling~~ cynicism. Hope speaks to imagining a life beyond capitalism, and combines a realistic sense of limits with a lofty vision of demanding the impossible. As Ernst Bloch once insisted, reason, justice and change cannot blossom without hope, because educated hope taps into our deepest experiences and longing for a life of dignity with others, a life in which it becomes possible to imagine a future that does not mimic the present. I am not referring to a romanticized and empty notion of hope, but to a notion of informed hope that faces the concrete obstacles and realities of domination but continues the ongoing task of "holding the present open and thus unfinished." (51)¶ The discourse of possibility not only looks for productive solutions. It also is crucial in defending those public spheres in which civic values, public scholarship and social engagement allow for a more imaginative grasp of a future that takes seriously the demands of justice, equity and civic courage. Democracy should encourage, even require, a way of thinking critically about education, one that connects equity to excellence, learning to ethics, and agency to the imperatives of social responsibility and the public good. Casino capitalism is a toxin that has created a predatory class of unethical zombies who are producing dead zones of the imagination that even Orwell could not have envisioned, while waging a fierce fight against the possibilities of a democratic future. The time has come to develop a political language in which civic values, social responsibility and the institutions that support them become central to invigorating and fortifying a new era of civic imagination, a renewed sense of social agency and an impassioned international social movement with a vision, organization and set of strategies to challenge the neoliberal nightmare engulfing the planet. Educators, artists, youth, intellectuals and others must refuse to succumb to the authoritarian forces that are circling US society, waiting for the resistance to stop and for the lights to go out. History is open, and as James Baldwin once insisted, "Not everything that is faced can be changed; but nothing can be changed until it is faced."

#### Individual ethical orientations aren’t effective – it’s more productive to rearticulate systems from the inside

Chandler 9 (Westminster IR senior lecturer, 2009, David, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, <http://m.friendfeed-media.com/ef12653960910c6594243a9a98293bfa1e1702ff#page=94>)

People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones – there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions; it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brainwashed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever-increasing awareness of themselves and by giving political meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning, while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geopolitical interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is downsizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an ‘ethical foreign policy’ in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing identity. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-term policy-making. Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere: namely, the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making, based on a clear political programme, to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict, etc. Of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the USA or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the civilised world, NATO or the EU are on the line in wars of choice (from the war on terror to the war on global warming) lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or coherent political programmes. As Jean Baudrillard (1983) suggests, without a connection to the represented masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’. It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. Donald Rumsfeld (2003) said that there are no metrics to help assess whether the war on terror is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber (2004) once counter-posed this type of politics – the ethics of conviction – to the ethics of responsibility in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq, and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues, from war crimes to EU membership requirements.

#### Rejecting sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation

Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p139, google books

Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to offer any understanding of why this might be. However, the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy. In fact a closer engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer from the same limitations.¶ The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system. However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make freedom a reality. ¶ Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.

#### Legalism resolves structures of oppression not the other way around

Pouliot 8 (Centre for International Peace and Security Studies director, 2008)

(Vincent, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities”, International Organization, Spring, ebsco)

The crucial question is obviously how do we get there? What are the sociopolitical processes that turn diplomacy into the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes? The conventional constructivist take on the matter would center on norm internalization. In this scheme, the peaceful settlement of disputes begins as an explicit norm with which security elites at first comply out of instrumental rationality. With iteration, the practice becomes internalized as legitimate or taken-for granted. In this connection, Checkel envisions three "modes of rationality" whereby deep socialization occurs: instrumental (strategic calculation), bounded (role playing) and communicative (normative suasion).'^^ Though useful, this internalization framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, it remains embroiled in the representational bias: taken-for-granted knowledge necessarily began as explicit representations upon which agents once reflected intentionally. A theory of practice of security communities, by contrast, emphasizes tacit learning, a cognitive mechanism that accounts for the transmission of practices without explicit teaching or reflexive compliance. For example, the concept of "communities of practice" allows for the theorization of "learning as social participation."'^' Collective learning occurs in and through practice, within communities of doers. Second, the norm internalization framework is sociologically thin: the social context that makes the logic of practicality possible is barely theorized. Especially lacking is a theorization of the power relations that constitute self-evident practices such as diplomacy within security communities. Contrary to widespread liberal views, peace is more than the result of the "arrangement of differences" or a "win-win compromise." Peace originates from the imposition of meanings through power relations, as barely perceptible as they may be. As Foucault argues: "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse."'''" Just like any social fact, peace or security communities never simply happen to be there: they necessarily are the result of past struggles among agents to define reality. Symbolic power turns a zero-sum struggle for the imposition of meanings into something that has all the attributes of a win-win relationship: interstate peace.''" But contrary to Foucault's "machinery that no one owns,""\*^ Bourdieu advances a practice-centered theory of symbolic power. Space constraints do not allow a full presentation of this complex notion here.'"-' To simplify, symbolic power—the imposition of meanings in and through social relations—feeds on the intersection of three elements: first, the field's structure of positions and distribution of valued capitals; second, the field's rules of the game; and third, the embodied dispositions that recognize given capitals as valuable. As a result, power may stem from a variety of resources depending on agents and contexts—from political authority to material riches through scientific credibility or cultural prestige. In any case, thanks to the contingent nexus of habitus and field, dominant players' practices tend to carve out dispositions in those who are socially exposed. The order of things is established through the iterated practices performed by capital-endowed agents, because their doing something in a certain way makes the implicit but powerful claim that "this is how things are." ''\*'\* Power is exerted at the level of inarticulate knowledge: meanings are thoughtlessly imposed in and through practice. As Polanyi illustrates, the archetype of such performative power relations is apprenticeship."\*^ In the diplomatic field, for instance, agents from certain states occupy positions of power and authority over others thanks to their possession of types of capitals that are valued, for a variety of historically contingent reasons, at a specific time and within a specific context. In the contemporary field of international security, the transatlantic security community possesses three types of capital that are internationally valued by most players—in part because it has been so promoted by the community itself: first, cultural capital (the community claims to embody the values of liberal democracy); second, institutional-material capital (the NATO organization and its assets); and third, symbolic capital (the community's pretense to be a "disinterested" teacher of universal ideals).''\*\* By systematically practicing diplomacy as if such a move were self-evident, dominant security elites from the transatlantic community make their counterparts see that things have changed— that peaceful change has become the "normal" way of behaving, as part of the (unthought) order of things.'''^ Wielding power in and through practice endows diplomacy with a doxic aura of self-evidence and naturalness. When a practice is so fully part of everyday routine that it is thoughtlessly but consensually enacted, it forms the background knowledge against which all social interaction takes place. The orchestra can play without a conductor, for doxa produces a commonsensical world of meanings and practices.'"\*^ In such a context, diplomacy becomes the shared background against which security elites interact. As a result, peaceful change can be dependably expected. Disagreements may remain but they are dealt with under the light of a nonviolent order of things. Nonviolent settlement of disputes is part of an inarticulate know-how that informs all further practices. In sum, security communities are intersubjectively real insofar as diplomacy is the commonsensical practice for security elites when faced with an interstate disagreement. This peaceful commonsense is established through symbolic power relations; and the practicality or self-evidence of diplomacy makes the social fact of international peace possible.